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Thesis
Private Military Companies (PMCs) are civilian staffed corporations that provide
military (and law enforcement) services, logistics, and support under contract to a
government both inside and outside the country’s borders. Prior to Congress passing the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction to prosecute
civilians accompanying United States’ Armed Forces overseas.

This article will

specifically address how the United States exercises jurisdiction and prosecutes the
civilian employees of PMCs in United States courts for crimes they have committed in
foreign countries while working under contract to the United States government.

“There is no security on this earth. Only opportunity.”
-General Douglas MacArthur

Part I – Introduction
Private Military Companies1 (PMCs) are playing a critical role in support of the
war on terror and in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.2 PMCs are also becoming a
common presence on military installations across the country and around the world.3

1

For clarification, private military companies can also be called, private military firms (PMFs), and private
security companies (PSCs). This article will use PMC to refer to both PMFs and PSCs throughout.

2

See, P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law,
42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 521, 522 (2004). (“PMCs…handled everything from feeding and housing U.S.
troops to maintaining sophisticated weapons systems like the B-2 stealth bomber, the F-117 stealth fighter,
the KC-10 refueling aircraft, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and numerous naval surface warships.”) Id.
3

See, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-03-695, Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, GAO, Military Operations: Contractors
Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans 7 (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03695.pdf [hereinafter GAO-03-695] (Table 1 show the
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Although the concept of a “private military”4 is nothing new, the corporate nature and
mission of today’s PMCs is groundbreaking and raises serious accountability questions.5
P.W. Stinger, a noted scholar who has written extensively about PMCs,6 defines PMCs as
“…profit driven organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to
warfare.”7 The concept of a civilian military government’s can hire for service seems
contrary to state practice when a state maintains a standing military, but history tells us
that private militaries have been used for centuries.8
The private military industry has boomed since the early 1990’s driven by what
Singer says are three dynamics: “…the end of the Cold War, transformations in the
nature of warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians, and a general trend
toward privatization and outsourcing of government functions around the world.”9 He

selected services provided by contractors in deployed locations. The extensive list contains many lobs
traditionally provided by military personnel.) Id.
4

This article defines a “private military” as a military force that has no particular attachment to a state and
can be hired by clients to perform military tasks, such as those that are usually preformed by a state
sponsored military.

5

Public accountability is a huge criticism of the industry. See, Martha Minow, Article: Outsourcing
Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46
B.C. L. Rev 989 (2005). (Minow argues that the government’s outsourcing has lead to huge accountability
issues, mainly because the current system lacks transparency.) Id.

6

P.W. Singer refers to private military corporations as PMFs or Private Military Firms.

7

Nathaniel Stinnett, Note: Regulating the Privatization of War: How to Stop Private Military Firms from
Committing Human Rights Abuses. 28 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 211 (2005), quoting, P.W. SINGER,
CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 26 Int’l Sec. 186, 188-89 (2001/02). I provide a fuller definition of PMCs in
Part I(A).
8

Id. at 215 (“As long as humanity has waged war, there have been mercenaries.” Stinnett traces the history
of private militaries back 3,000 years to the Numidian mercenaries that Ramses II hired to attack Kadesh in
1294 B.C. and other ancient wars. Id. at 212. Although in his article’s context they were actually
mercenaries, I would argue that American PMCs are not mercenaries under either U.S. or international
law.) See also, P.W. STINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS 19-39 (Cornell University Press) (2003). (Singer
tracks the history of PMCs from ancient times to the new corporate military that exists today.) Id.
9

Singer supra note 7.
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further cites the military’s downsizing after the Cold War and the instability that resulted
in the world left a need for services that were not being adequately provided by the
traditional military forces.10 The U.S. still needed military services and support so they
utilized the private sector to take over in the areas they had downsized to keep up with
the demand.11
Recently, military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have created a huge new
market for America’s PMCs and the need for their services is almost insatiable.12 Many
American based PMCs earning large government contracts were startups that arose out of
a dormant group of highly skilled former military servicemen that were able to
effectively provide what the United States government did not have or were unwilling to
use traditional military forces to accomplish.13 After 9/1114, the U.S. began two massive
foreign military operations, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation
Iraqi Freedom in Iraq.15 America’s use of PMCs in these two operations has raised

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

See, Nathan Hodge, Army Chief Notes ‘Problematic’ Potential of Armed Contractors On the Battlefield,
6 Defense Daily International 32 (2005). (“Deployed U.S. forces rely heavily on private contractors, who
provide everything from laundry service and dining facilities to equipment maintenance and force
protection. Security work is a major growth area: the Government Accountability Office recently revealed
that, by the end of 2004, U.S. agencies had obligated over $766 million for private security in Iraq. Firms
such as Blackwater USA and Triple Canopy have won major awards to protect government-funded aid and
reconstruction projects, in addition to guarding U.S. government personnel and military installations.”) Id.
13

Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, The New York Times, August 14, 2005. Sec. 6 Col 1. (Bergner traces
the formation of “Triple Canopy,” a PMC that formed shortly after 9/11. Triple Canopy used ex-U.S.
Special Forces to put together a team to guard 13 Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters throughout
Iraq under a contract worth about $90 million.) Id.
14

On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four aircraft. American flight 11 and United flight
175 struck the World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York. American flight 77 struck the Pentagon in
Washington D.C. United flight 93 went down in an empty field outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania after
passengers on board fought the terrorists for control of the aircraft, which was headed for the White house
or the Capitol. Nat’l Comm. on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Comm’n Report. 1-14.
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serious accountability issues that Congress has only recently attempted to correct.16 One
of the major accountability issues was that PMCs were civilian staffed and could not be
prosecuted for crimes they committed overseas because U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction.17
The Abu Ghraib scandal, for example, involved civilians working for PMCs that
were operating under contract to the United States government.18 Steven A. Stefanowicz,
a civilian contractor for CACI International, was an interrogator for U.S. military
intelligence at Abu Ghraib.19 He was identified along with others, including military
servicemen, as a participant in the abuses.20 For example, during the court-martial of Sgt.
Michael J. Smith, a dog handler for the U.S. Army at Abu Ghraib, the court identified
that Mr. Stefanowicz had directed Sgt. Smith to use his dog to terrorize particular inmates
without proper authorization or direction from his supervisors.21 Mr. Stefanowicz has yet

15

Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq started at 9:34 PM EST on March 19, 2003. Global Security.org:
Operation Iraqi Freedom, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom.htm, (last visited on
March 31, 2006). Operation Enduring Freedom started October 7, 2001. Global Security.org: Operation
Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm, (last
visited on March 31, 2006).

16

See generally supra, Minow at note 5.

17

See, Part II and the provisions of MEJA. There is always the possibility that the local government could
exercise criminal jurisdiction over someone, but in virtually lawless countries, such as post invasion Iraq
and Afghanistan, such an action by the local authorities is highly unlikely.

18

Mark Benjamin and Michael Scherer, “Big Steve” and Abu Ghraib, Salon.com, March 31, 2006. (The
article discusses the court-martial of Sgt. Michael J. Smith, who testified that Steven A. Stefanowicz, a
civilian contractor for CACI International, was at the helm of some of the abuses at Abu Ghraib.) Id.
19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.
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to be prosecuted for his role in the abuses.22 In contrast Pvt. Ivan Frederick II, one of the
U.S. servicemen prosecuted in October 2004 for his role in the prisoner abuse.23
This paper will address the issue the U.S. government faces with regard to Mr.
Stefanowicz and those like him; how does the United States prosecute civilians who
accompany the military overseas for criminal acts?24 For examples of the types of crimes
that have gone unpunished I will refer to current operations in Iraq and past operations in
Kosovo.25 In both of these locations, the Department of Defense (DOD) has a military
presence and PMCs are present and operating under U.S. government contracts for their
services. In the later case, Iraq, PMCs account for a force of more than 20,000 personnel
serving under numerous contracts and various functions.26
Part I of this Article will discuss and define private military companies. This
discussion should provide the reader with an understanding of what these companies do
22

Id.

23

Id.

24

This paper will only address those PMCs that are under contract to the United States government for
services. I will not address PMCs operating under contract to foreign governments or American PMCs not
under contract to the United State government.

25

“The Kosovo crisis began in early 1998 when large-scale fighting broke out, resulting in the
displacement of some 300,000 people. A ceasefire was agreed in October 1998 which enabled refugees to
find shelter, averting an impending humanitarian crisis over the winter. A Verification Mission was
deployed under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
However, violence continued and the situation worsened significantly in January 1999. A peace
conference, held in Paris, broke up on 19 March with the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation to accept a
peaceful settlement. Operation Allied Force was a NATO contingency response aiming at ensuring full
compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (Sept. 23rd 1998). Operation Noble Anvil was the
American component of this NATO action to promote regional stability, cooperation and security, in
support of the international community. At 1900 hours GMT on 24 March 1999, NATO forces began air
operations over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” Global Security.org: Operation Iraqi Freedom,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/allied_force.htm , (last visited on April 11, 2006).
26

See, Hodge supra note 12. (“While precise numbers are hard to come by, the Brookings Institution
estimates there are more than 20,000 private military contractors in Iraq today.”); See also, Stephen Fidler,
Steady growth expected after the bubble Private Security Companies: At present Iraq is providing the lion’s
share of work, Financial Times, September 13, 2005, at 4. (The private sector is the second largest of armed
foreigners in Iraq after the U.S. military.) Id.

-5-

Dustin Tipling
and why there is a problem regarding criminal prosecution. Part II will discuss the law
which seeks to extend jurisdiction, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)
and its substantive provisions. The first section of Part II focuses on the two major
sections of the Act, the definitions of contract employees and the substantive provision
that provides for jurisdiction in U.S. courts. The remaining sections of Part II discuss the
other provisions of MEJA and how they relate to the employees of PMCs. Finally, Part
III will discuss the positive and negative aspects of MEJA. This Article concludes that
while the Act is a major improvement allowing for criminals to be brought to justice,
there are still aspects of MEJA that need to be fixed for the law to truly be an effective
remedy.
A. Defining “private military company”
A formal and concrete definition of a “private security company” is illusive.27
PMCs escape a formal definition because there is no “model” PMC that all of the various
corporations would neatly fit into without compromising clarity. Many of the new PMCs
signing contracts with the U.S. government in Iraq and Afghanistan developed around a
group of individuals with a specific set of skills that is useful only to the military.28 The

27

“Military companies offer military skills that were once the preserve of governments. Their essential
purpose is to enhance the capability of a client’s military forces to function better in war, or to deter
conflict more effectively. These companies are distinct from organizations operating in other areas of the
security industry in that they are designed to have a strategic impact on the security and political
environments of weak states facing a significant military threat.” David Shearer, Private Armies and
Military Intervention. Adelphi Paper 316. at 23.
I think that this definition is restrictively narrow because I think it misses a gap that many PMCs
play, the role of gap filler. The US uses PMCs to operate high tech machinery that would traditionally be
reserved for a soldier. They aren’t necessarily “enhancing” rather they are filling a necessary function
because they cost less or there is not time to train a soldier. I think these types of definitions may fit
somewhat in a general description of PMCs worldwide, but they are not tailored to describe many of the
PMCs the U.S. contracts with. By “enhance” I think Shearer is referring to countries that are
supplementing their military with services they could not possibly develop or operate themselves. This is
not the case in the U.S. because usually the U.S. uses PMCs because it would result in an inefficient use of
resources to use traditional military forces to do the same job.
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company then either focuses on that set of skills or expands their operations from that
basic area to other areas in an effort to win more government contracts.29 Further, some
PMCs operate as subsidiaries, divisions, or under contract with larger corporations.30
First, this Article will differentiate between private contractors in general and
private military contractors or PMCs. Although the scope of this paper could discuss
both, their roles are very different.

A private contractor can potentially be any

corporation with a contract to provide services, support, labor, or any other conceivable
good to the United States government. Whereas PMC contracts usually provide services
that relate only to military services and support.31
The distinction is important because many of the current crimes and abuses that
private contractors have been accused of involve PMCs, not simply government
contractors in general.32 Although there is potential for regular contractors that are not
classified as PMCs to commit just as serious crimes, the position of this article is that the

28

See Singer supra note 2. See also, Hodge supra note 12.

29

See, Bergner supra note 13. (Triple Canopy, a PMC, developed by Matt Mann, a retired U.S. Army
Special Operations master sergeant, to put to use the training he and his fellow comrades had received
while serving in the U.S. military) Id.
30

For example, DynCorp International LLC was a fully owned corporate subsidiary of Computer Sciences
Corporation. History of DI, http://www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=54 (last visited on March 31, 2006).

31

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-737, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of
Private Security Providers (2005), available at, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05737.pdf. [hereinafter
GAO-05-737]. (In Iraq and generally, PMCs provide the following services: Static security-security for
hosing areas and work sites; Personal security details-security for high-ranking U.S. officials; Security
escorts-security for government employees, contractor employees, or others as they move through Iraq;
Convoy security-security for vehicles and their occupants as they make their way into Iraq within Iraq;
Security advice and planning.) Id. at 9; See also, Peter W. Singer, Outsourcing War, Foreign Affairs,
March 1, 2005. (“PMFs are businesses that provide governments with professional services intricately
linked to warfare; they represent, in other words, the corporate evolution of the age-old profession of
mercenaries. Unlike the individual dogs of war of the past, however, PMFs are corporate bodies that offer
a wide range of services, from tactical combat operations and strategic planning got logistical support and
technical assistance.”) Id.

32

I discuss these current abuses and crimes in Part II.
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focus should be placed on PMCs because of their close engagement with combat,
civilians, and the military.

Further, any laws that provide for prosecution of PMC

employees will most likely cover non-PMC contractors as well.33 Scholars point to
government contracting with PMCs as suspect and secretive because of the semi-public
function of their services but cloak and dagger style.34
1.

PMCs Have Brought Out Into The Light and Under The

Magnifying Glass
When four Blackwater USA’s35 employees were brutally killed, dragged thought
the streets of Falluja, Iraq, and hung from a bridge by an angry mob of Iraqis in March of
2004 the debate over PMCs and their role in military conflicts really came light in the
American media.36 Blackwater USA, one of the many PMCs used by United States,
proudly states they can provide governments with everything from a professional military
to peacekeeping solutions on a global scale.37 Blackwater USA is just one of dozens of

33

My conclusion provides support for this inference. Also, MEJA’s provisions do not limit criminal
jurisdiction to PMCs only. See, Part II.

34

35

See generally, Stinnett at note 7.
Blackwater USA is an American owned PMC operating out of North Carolina.

36

Jeffrey Gettleman, 4 from U.S. Killed in Ambush in Iraq; Mob Drags Bodies, N.Y. Times, April 1, 2004.;
Blackwater USA was “founded in 1997 by former Navy SEAL Eric Prince, the son of a billionaire and an
active contributor to Republican causes, Blackwater won a $21 million contract to protect U.S. Ambassador
Paul Bremer, who ran the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq until June 2004. It still guards U.S. State
Department personnel in Iraq.” Frontline: Private Warriors,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/companies.html (last visited March
31, 2006).

37

Blackwater.com, About, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/about (last visited March 15, 2006). (“We are
not simply a ‘private security company.’ We are a professional military, law enforcement, security,
peacekeeping, and stability operations firm who provides turnkey solutions. We assist with the
development of national and global security policies and military transformation plans. We can train, equip
and deploy public safety and military professionals, build live-fire indoor/outdoor ranges, MOUT facilities
and shoot houses, create ground and aviation operations and logistics support packages, develop and
execute canine solutions for patrol and explosive detection, and can design and build facilities both
domestically and in austere environments abroad.”) Id.
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PMCs operating in Iraq today. For example, one of Blackwater’s contracts was to protect
dignitaries and high-level diplomats while they are working or serving in Iraq.38 But not
all PMCs provide protective security, but in Iraq for example, it is one of the biggest
sectors of the industry.39

Not only do PMCs provide security for all high-level

dignitaries, they support and secure many of the other companies that have contracts with
the United States government in Iraq.40
2. The employees of PMCs
There is no “typical” employee of a PMC, but most of them recruit from the same
talent pool. For example, most PMCs utilize military or law enforcement experts drawn
from ex-Special Forces or civilian police forces to fulfill their contract obligations to the
U.S. government.41 Another area the media criticizes and which has become an area of

38

James Dao, Private Guards Take Big Risks, For Right Price, The New York Times April 2, 2004. Sec.
A Col 3. (Dao describes some of Blackwater’s contracts in Iraq. One was to provide personal protection
for L. Paul Bremer III, the former head of the civilian administration in Iraq.) Id.

39

. See, Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a
Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev 549, 552 (2005). (“No one should be
surprised to find contractors involved in almost every aspect of the U.S. government’s efforts in
Iraq…Outsourcing…is one of the five government-wide initiatives in the Bush management agenda.”) Id.

40

Id. at 553-54.

41

For example Blackwater’s basic requirements for a Protective Security Specialists (PSS) include:
[Applicant] [m]ust have minimum of one (1) year experience in providing protective
security services in: special operations, US military Special Forces, US Secret Service, or
other federal agencies, commercial executive protection services, or law enforcement
experience (i.e. US Military Police/Criminal Investigation Division, local & state law
enforcement agencies).
Blackwater.com, Security Operations,
http://www.blackwaterusa.com/securityconsulting/secopps.asp (last visited March 15, 2006).
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concern is their salary.42 PMC employees can earn very attractive salaries working
overseas, some as high as $20,000 or more a month in Iraq for example.43
This is in stark comparison to the salary the same person would receive as a
member of the armed services performing a similar function.44 The substantially higher
salaries offered by the private sector by PMCs is causing a real and serious hardship on
the U.S. Special Forces community because they are taking all of their highly trained and
specialized soldiers to the private sector.45 The U.S. government is essentially bidding
against the private sector for services and skills that they paid for and developed. By this
statement I mean that the U.S. government recruits and trains elite Special Forces troops
only to loose them to the private sector because of their high salary offers. Then the U.S.
government will turn around and contract with a PMC that has hired their former solider.
The next section discusses why exactly the United States uses PMCs and further
addresses this seemingly contradictory anomaly.
B. Why does the United States use PMCs?
Critics and scholars alike often ask why does the United States, and in particular,
the DOD uses contractors?46 There are many different ways to approach this question,

42

John Swain, Making a Killing, The Australina Magazine, Dec. 3, 2005, at 30. (Swain points to the large
salaries paid to PMCs by the U.S. government to help stabilize Iraq. He cites that some PMCs pay more
that $1,300 a day.) Id.

43

See, Michael N. Schmitt, Article War, International Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the
Game in a New Century, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 511, 515 (2005). (PMC employees holding senior positions can
earn more than $20,000 a month. Blue color workers can earn $80,000 to $100,000 annual in Iraq). Id.
44

A Sergeant Major in the Army (E-9) with over 16 years of service will earn $4,363.50 a month, not
including base allowance and housing pay. DOD Military Pay Tables (2006), available at
http://www.dod.mil/dfas/militarypay/newinformation/WebPayTableVersion2006updated.pdf.
45

Id.
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but the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative wing of
Congress, found an apt answer in a relatively recent report when Congress asked this
particular question.47

The report limited its geographic scope to the Balkans and

Southwest Asia and most of their comments relate specifically to these two geographic
areas, but their comments are likely true for DOD contractors generally and other
geographic locations. First, I will discuss the traditional responses given as to why the
U.S. uses PMCs, and then I will discuss the findings of the GAO report.
1. Traditional reasons
As the Article mentions earlier, the post-Cold War strategy with regard to military
forces included reducing the price tag of national defense.48 The traditional view was
that by using PMCs the government could save money.49 Some scholars content that one
of many reasons they use PMCs is their cheaper price tag when compared to utilizing the
traditional Armed Forces.50 Scholars that study the industry argue about whether PMCs
actually cost less than traditional military forces, but there is no clear authority favoring
either argument.51 What is clear is their pervasive and growing use by the United States.

46

See generally, STINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 8, at 49-70. (Singer discusses the
privatization of security globally since the end of the Cold War.) Id.
47

GAO-03-695 supra note 3.

48

Mark W. Bina, Comment: Private Contractor Liability and Accountability after Abu Ghraib, 38 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 1237, 1241 (2005). See also, Singer supra note 8.
49

Schooner supra note 37, at 553.

50

Herbert M. Howe, The Privatization of International Affairs: Global Order and the Privatization of
Security 22 Fletcher F. World Aff. 1, 5-6 (1998). (Howe argues that PMCs are relatively inexpensive and
fill can fill a void on demand.) I would argue with that proposition and side with Schooner’ argument
because he cites to numerous studies and reports that show they do not actually save money. I think
Howe’s position may be supportable if you consider all PMCs operating in all countries worldwide and for
countries other than the U.S., but his argument looses support when you examine PMCs under contract
with the U.S. government.
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The end of the Cold War brought a drop in troop levels resulting in a deficiency
that the military filled using the private sector in order to complete their objectives.52
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990, NATO reduced its armed forces and lowered its
troop levels.53 At that time NATO was hesitant to commit any sizable or large forces in
foreign theaters for extended durations.54 This is when the private sector stepped into the
picture. They were able to provide the “…weapons, technology, intelligence, strategy,
training, and soldiers” that were necessary to complete military objectives the Armed
Forces were unable to perform alone.55 That was true in the 1990’s and it is certainly true
now; military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan makes this point ring clear. The next
section will discuss the findings of a government report by the GAO on the use of PMCs.
2. GAO report on the U.S. Government’s use of PMCs
The GAO report mentions two specific reasons why the United States hires
PMCs: force caps and limited military skill.56 Force caps are limitations imposed by the
Executive Branch, law, or agreements with host countries and other allies on the number
of U.S. military personnel that can be present in a foreign country at a given time.57 So
51

See, Schmittsupra note 42, at 511. Some argue with this proposition stating they do not. See, Schooner
supra note 37, at 553. (Schooner argues that the government’s use of PMCs does not save money, rather
hiring private employees in Iraq avoids “…making toughs political choices concerning military needs,
reserve call-ups and human consequences of war.” Id.) See, Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 879, 929-30
(2004). (Rosky provides the scholarly debate on the economic efficiency of PMCs. He concedes that
PMCs are economically efficient, but recognizes that the position is controversial) Id.
52

Id.

53

Rosky, supra note 48, at 906.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 907.

56

Id. at 2

57

Id. at 8
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basically the U.S. can stay under the force cap requirement but still have sufficient
personnel in the country to conduct their operations. Once a force cap is in place,
contractors take the place of servicemen and women so that can be available for strictly
military activities.58 The report also mentions for example, the U.S. Army’s substitution
of private contractors for soldiers at the gate and base perimeter to provide security for
the base in Bosnia.59
The second reason discussed in the GAO report is DOD’s limited number of
available skill to deploy in a given situation.60 One striking example provided in the
report was the use of civilian contractors to run the Air Force’s Predator unmanned aerial
vehicle.61 In that case, Air Force personnel simply were not trained to operate the
equipment.62 Private contractors were used to fill the gap to keep the program up and
operating. There are other examples where the military designs a program to uses PMCs
to support the mission from inception. The Marine Corp’s for example, operate one of
their weapons systems with partial contractor by design.63

Since PMCs perform

functions traditionally reserved for a regular military force sponsored by the government,
the media and scholars often bring up the topic of mercenaries.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 9
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C. Military Corporations and Mercenaries
The debate over whether employees of PMCs operating in foreign countries are
mercenaries arises when scholars and the media discuss the industry. Any in-depth
discussion of the distinctions made under international law is outside the scope of this
paper but I will examine such a classification narrowly to bring it within the topic of this
paper.64 The US has implemented domestic legislation prohibiting mercenaries and there
is not any serious legal argument that the PMCs under contract to the United States are
mercenaries under any domestic definition.65
Singer, describes the corporate PMC by its new corporate structure and
distinguishes them from what traditionally would be a mercenary.
[PMCs]…are hieratically organized into incorporated and registered
businesses that trade and compete openly in the international market, link
to outside financial holdings, recruit more proficiently that their
predecessors, and provide a wider range of military services to a greater
variety and number of clients. Corporatization not only distinguishes
[PMCs]…from mercenaries and other past private military ventures, but it
also offers certain advantages in both efficiency and effectiveness.66
PMCs operating under U.S. contracts do not generally meet any definition under
international law as “mercenaries.”67 But it is certainly true that until recently, there has
been no way to hold employees of PMCs accountable for crimes they commit overseas

64

For a discussion of international law and mercenaries, See generally, Ellen L. Frye, Note: Private
Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining “Mercenary” can tame the “Dogs of War,” 73
Fordham L. Rev. 2607 (2005); See also, James R. Coleman, Constraining Modern Mercenarism, 55
Hastings L.J. 1493 (2004).
65

See, Deborah Avant. Think Again: Mercenaries, Foreign Policy, July/August 1994, available at,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2577&print=1. (“Today’s private security
companies are corporate endeavors that perform logistics support, training, security, intelligence work, risk
analysis, and much more.”) Id. I am referring specifically to American owned and run PMCs. I am not
referring to “Executive Outcomes” or any other non-U.S. owned PMC.
66

Stinnett at 214, quoting, P.W. Stinger supra note 7, at 188-89.

67

See STINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 8, at 42-48.
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while accompanying the military.68

This Article posits that PMCs draw so much

criticism because it is seems difficult to hold them accountable. Their pervasive foreign
work alongside military forces and on behalf of governments makes international law
seem like the appropriate method to regulate or at least have an impact on the industry.
Any discussion of this would be outside the scope of this paper, but the United States has
an easier way to hold PMCs accountable simply by exercising its legislative power, and
they have—the Military Exterritorial Jurisdiction Act.

Part II – A. The Jurisdictional Gap for criminal prosecution of civilians
Congress enacted the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to provide
criminal prosecution for crimes committed by civilians accompanying the military
overseas. The problem (or gap) has beleaguered the Armed Forces for years before its
enactment because civilians have long accompanied the military in foreign
deployments.69 MEJA was introduced in various forms for nearly forty years before
President Clinton signed the act into law on November 22, 2000.70
The problem faced by Congress was the United States usually lacked jurisdiction
over its citizens outside of its borders.71 When Americans committed crimes overseas
there were many instances where the local jurisdiction would not prosecute them for

68

See Part II(A)

69

Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing the Gap in Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed
Forces Abroad—A First Person Account of the Creation of the Military Extraterritorial Act of 2000. 51
Cath. U.L. Rev. 55, 55-56 (2001). (Schmitt was one of the drafters of MEJA and played a key role in its
enactment.)

70

Id. at 78-79

71

Id.

- 15 -

Dustin Tipling
crimes they committed.72

Since many of the crimes—some very serious—were

committed against other Americans overseas the local jurisdiction simply did not see
local prosecution as their problem. Robert E. Reed, Associate Deputy General Counsel
of the DOD testified at a hearing during Congress’ deliberations of MEJA. He testified
that in large part the inability of the United States to hold its citizens criminally liable for
crimes committed overseas “…undermined deterrence, lowered morale, and threatened
good order and discipline in our military communities overseas.”73 Reed also testified
about the need for the civilian component of the armed forces. He said:
…the inability of U.S. authorities to adequately respond to serious
misconduct with the civilian component of the U.S. Armed Forces,
presents the strong potential for embarrassment in the international
community, increases the possibility of hostility in the host nation’s local
community where our forces are assigned, and threatens relationships with
our allies.74
In the past, remedies available to punish civilian contractors accompanying the
military overseas for crimes they committed was to administratively discipline the
employee or fire them and bar further employment under a government contract.75 This
was obviously insufficient when a civilian has committed a serious crime such as
murder, sexually based crimes, or a major theft. Congress implemented MEJA in 2000 to
close the jurisdictional gap that allowed criminals to go unpunished for their crimes
simply because they committed them overseas outside the territorial jurisdiction of U.S.

72

Id. (Also, in two important Supreme Court cases, Reid v. Covert 352 U.S. 77 (1956), and Kinsella v.
Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), the Court declined to extend the Uniform Code of Military Justice to
civilians in criminal cases. In both cases, spouses of servicemen were tired before a military court martial
for the murder of their husbands.
73

Schmitt supra note 68, at 77

74

Id.

75

Id. at 73.
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courts. The Act lay dormant without actual use until 2004 when it could have potentially
brought civilian suspects of the Abu Ghraib abuses to justice.
March of 2004 provide a clear example of MEJA failing to be effective during the
fallout after the Abu Ghraib scandal.76 The investigations into the abuses found that
civilians were responsible for some of the abuses, especially civilian contractors working
with the military at the prison.77 This investigation revealed that CACI, Inc. of Arlington,
Virginia, who provides interrogators and Titan Corp of San Diego, California, who
provided translators were responsible for some of the abuses.78
A contract interrogator working for CACI, Steven Stefanowicz, was accused of
giving military police instructions that he knew would constitute physical abuse without
authority.79

The CACI contract to provide interrogators was with the Interior

Department’s National Business center, not with DOD.80 Since the contract was not with
the DOD, MEJA did not apply, and the employees under the contract were not subject to
U.S. criminal jurisdiction and effectively escaped any potential prosecution. In Part II
below, this Article discusses the definition of a “contract employee” under MEJA and
why the definition only covered those under contract to the DOD.
This was not the first time U.S. civilian contractors for PMCs accompanying the
military abroad had committed crimes and escaped prosecution. A few years prior,

76

Tony Capaccio, U.S. Military Tightens Rules for Contractors in Combat Zones, Bloomberg.com, Oct. 27,
2005, http://ipoaonline.org/news/legislative/display.cfm?ID=270.

77

Fredrick A. Stein, Article: Have We Closed the Barn Door Yet? A Look at the Current Loopholes in the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. 27 Hous. J. Int’l L 579, 590.

78

Stein supra,at 598

79

Id.

80

Id.
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several DynCorp employees working under contract in the Balkans81 allegedly ran a
prostitution ring involving girls as young as twelve.

None of the accused were

prosecuted or disciplined by a court of law and have escaped any punishment other than
termination of their employment.82 So in essence, those identified were sent home and
fired and nothing more became of their criminal act.83
MEJA was enacted to prevent criminals from escaping justice simply because
U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction. Since MEJA was enacted only one civilian, the spouse of
an Air Force servicemen, has been subject to prosecution.84 MEJA was subsequently
amended in March 2004 to close this second gap85 in the law. Many PMCs under
contract with the U.S. government were in Iraq and in other foreign countries under
contract from a federal agency other than the DOD and the atrocities discovered in Abu
Ghraib made this loophole clear to Congress. This second gap happened because some
PMCs were not covered under MEJA and therefore, like offenders in years before, were
not subject to criminal prosecution for their crimes for lack of jurisdiction. The CACI
incident at Abu Ghraib mentioned above was a stunning example of this second gap. The

81

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

82

Nathaniel Stinnett, Note: Regulating the Privatization of War: How to Stop Private Military Firms from
Committing Human Rights Abuses. 28 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 211, 215 (2005).

83

Stein supra note 75, at 589. See also, Jennifer Murray, Note: Who Will Police the Peace-Builders? The
Failure to Establish Accountability for the Participation of United Nations Civilian Police in the
Trafficking of Women in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34 Colum Human Rights L. Rev. 475, 477
(2003). (Civilian police in post-conflict Bosnia were accused of buying and selling women, and conspiring
with organized criminal groups to smuggle women.) Id.

84

Id.

85

I am referring to the inability of the United States to prosecute the employees of the PMCs that
contracted with the DOD to perform linguistic and interrogation services at Abu Ghraib. See supra notes
79-89 and accompanying text.
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next section will focus specifically on MEJA’s substantive provisions, including the
difference between the 2000 Act and the 2004 amendment.
B. The Significance of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
Many scholars that study the area discuss the laws guiding PMCs generally and in
the context of international law or pay only lip service to domestic law. Although
international law is of prime importance in this area, it is simply too vast to consider
along with purely domestic laws in depth in any one paper. Further, domestic law in the
United States in this area is in a state of flux with many “gray areas” still untouched by
Congress.
As I discussed in the previous section86, many critics see PMCs as mercenaries or
soldiers or fortune, lacking any accountability,87 but such a generalization is simply an
exaggeration with regard to PMCs hired by the U.S. government. PMCs are hired and
contracted by the United States under rules provided by the Defense Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and subject to contract termination.88

Further,

employees of PMCs are potentially subject to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act (MEJA)89, which provides for prosecution of crimes committed on foreign soil by
civilians accompanying the military in US courts. These two bodies of law, the DFARS
regulations and the MEJA are substantial. I will focus specifically on MEJA and the
86

See supra section 1(c).

87

James Surowiecki, The Talk of the Town, The New Yorker, January 5, 2004,
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/talk/040112ta_talk_surowiecki (argues that civilian contractors are
not efficient.) Id.

88

Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Mission and Vision,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/about/missionvision.htm. (last accesed April 11, 2006). (“Lead defense
acquisition by providing the policy, guidance, and oversight to effectively deliver the right goods and
services to the warfighter”) Id.

89

Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §3261(2004).
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criminal jurisdiction it provides over civilians accompanying the military in foreign
countries—those civilians I will discuss in particular are the employees of PMCs.
C. The New Crime: MEJA
Although its name suggests it, the MEJA is not simply a jurisdictional statute—it
is a crime in and of itself.90 Congress enacted the original statute in 2000 to prosecute
crimes committed by civilians accompanying the military overseas because of a chronic
problem; civilians were not being prosecuted for crimes they had committed and the local
jurisdiction where the crime occurred overseas was not prosecuting them.91

In the

following section I will describe each of the relevant sections of the Act with an emphasis
on civilian prosecution and how the Act affects PMCs.
1. Section 3267 – Definitions
The “Definitions” section of the Act is one of the most critical parts of the act
with regard to PMCs because it dictates whether the statute applies to the employee or
not. Essentially, if the PMC does not fall into one of the specific classes of the Act, U.S.
Courts will lack jurisdiction to prosecute an employee who been accused of committing a
crime. This was the problem the U.S. government faced during the Abu Ghraib scandal,
because the civilians found to be part of the abuses did not fall under the Act.92 The
original definition in section 3267 of MEJA defined those “civilians” who could face
potential prosecution.
90

Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing the Gap in Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed
Forces Abroad—A First Person Account of the Creation of the Military Extraterritorial Act of 2000. 51
Cath. U.L. Rev. 55, 113 (2001). (Schmitt, one of the Act’s drafters, discusses a debate with DOD
representative regarding whether the statute was enacting a new crime or extending the reach of all existing
federal crimes to persons accompanying the military overseas. DOD was eventually convinced that it is a
crime rather than simply a jurisdictional extension.)

91

See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.

92

Id.
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Prior to the amendment in 2004, section 3267 stated a civilian employed by the
Armed Forces outside of the Untied States is any civilian employee of the DOD, a DOD
Contractor, (including a subcontractor at any tier) or as an employee of a DOD
contractor.93 This meant that if you worked for the DOD, as a civilian, or you worked for
a contractor to the DOD you were potentially subject to criminal prosecution by a U.S.
Court for crimes you may have committed overseas while working for the DOD or under
a DOD contract. This provision essentially filled that first gap that existed for decades
and created a basis for U.S. jurisdiction to prosecute civilians.94
But, under the 2000 Act contractors servicing contracts provided by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of State (DOS), or other federal agencies
did not fall under the definition of section 3267 thus creating a second gap in the law.
The employees that had committed crimes in Bosnia and at Abu Ghraib in Iraq did not

93

18 U.S.C. § 3267 (2000).:
(1) The term ‘employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States’ means—
(A) employed as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense (including a
nonappropriated fund instrumentality of the Department), as a Department of Defense
contractor (including a subcontractor at any tier), or as an employee of a Department of
Defense contractor (including a subcontractor at any tier);
(B) Present or residing outside the United States in connection with such employment;
and
(C) not a national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation.
(2) The term ‘accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States’ means—
(A) a dependent of—
(i) a member of the Armed Forces’
(ii) a civilian employee of the Department of Defense (including a
nonappropriated fund instrumentality of the Department); or
(iii) a Department of Defense contractor (including a subcontractor at any tier);
(B) residing with such member, civilian employee, contractor, or contractor employee
outside the United States;
(C) not a national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation.
(3) The term ‘Armed Forces’ has the meaning given the term ‘armed forces’ in section 101(a)(4) of title 10
[emphasis added]
94

Unfortunately, the 2000 Act as originally passed by Congress provided for jurisdiction over only “…a
Department of Defense contractor…” This explicit mention of DOD contractors effectively excluded all
other contractors that might be employed under contract to the United States government.
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fall under the definition of a civilian contractor.95 As I discussed earlier, after the
prostitution ring ran by DynCorp employees in Bosnia and the Abu Ghraib scandal in
Iraq, Congress felt pressure to amend the statute to include those contractors employed
under contracts to other branches of the government.
On October 28, 2004, Congress amended the MEJA to include the following
language, “a civilian employee of…any other Federal agency, or any provisional
authority, to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the
Department of Defense overseas…”96 The amendment was in response to the inability of
the government to prosecute those offenders who were working under contract to the
U.S. government at Abu Ghraib. This amendment created jurisdiction over any federal
employee, or employee of a contractor as long as they were supporting a DOD mission
overseas.97 The amendment would effectively place the PMCs involved in Abu Ghraib
under U.S. criminal jurisdiction. Titan, one of the PMC’s accused in the scandal, was
contracted through the Interior Department’s National Business center, which at the time
would not have fallen under MEJA.98 After the 2004 amendment, the employees would
have been subject to U.S. criminal jurisdiction. Once a civilian has met the definition of
a prosecutable civilian we look to section 3261 which provides for prosecution of the
individual.

95

In reference to the abuses mentioned in Part II(A).

96

Id. at (1)(A)(i)(II), (1)(A)(ii)(II), (1)(A)(iii)(II) (Oct. 28, 2004 Amendment).

97

Id.

98

See, Stein supra note 75.
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2. Section 3261 – Creating The Criminal Offense
The core of MEJA is section 3261 which creates the new federal criminal offense
and provides jurisdiction for the U.S. to prosecute crimes in U.S. federal court for acts
committed overseas.99 The federal crime is defined as “…conduct engaged in outside the
United States by a member of the Armed Forces or by persons employed by or
accompanying the Armed Forces abroad that would be a felony if had occurred in the
United States…” when that conduct is punishable by more than one year in prison.100
Section 3261 provides that both individuals employed by or accompanying the
Armed Forces outside the United States or while a member of the Armed Forces may be
punished under the statute. This technically provides double jurisdiction for those who
are members of the Armed Forces—they would be subject to both the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) and civilian criminal prosecution under MEJA.101 However, the
statute does not allow discretion; members of the Armed Forces may only be prosecuted
under MEJA if they are indicted with at least one civilian for their crimes committed
together.102
This gives the DOD the responsibility to prosecute military members unless they
are involved in a conspiracy or other illegal act along with a civilian.103 PMCs always
employ civilians and therefore their employees fall under only the first part of the section
as “civilians” and can not be classified as a member of the Armed Forces. The situation

99

See, 18 U.S.C. §3261 (2004).

100

Schmitt supra note 87, at 113-14; See also, Id.

101

18 U.S.C. §3261(a)(2)

102

Id.

103

Schmitt supra note 87, at 115.
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where a member of the Armed Forces is prosecuted along with a civilian is foreseeable
considering how closely many PMCs work with their military counterparts.104 Thus,
under the 2004 amendment to MEJA, Steven Stefanowicz and the military service men
who assisted him in abuses at Abu Ghraib would both be subject to criminal jurisdiction.
Section 3261(b) limits the ability of the United States to prosecute civilians if the
foreign government where the crime occurred has prosecuted or is prosecuting a person
for the offense and it is in accord with the jurisdiction of the United States.105 However,
the civilian may also be prosecuted in the United States after a foreign government’s
prosecution for offenses that violate section 3261 if the Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, or a person acting in either of those capacities approves. 106 According
to Schmitt this provides the United States “…’a second bite at the apple’ in order to
prosecute a defendant a second time, presumably when it believes that the punishment by
the host nation is insufficient.”107 As I discussed earlier, this was to prevent criminals
from escaping justice because the country where the crime occurred failed to prosecute
the individual or the punishment was inadequate according to U.S. standards for the
crime.
3. Section 3262 – Arrest and commitment and Section 3263 – Delivery
to authorities of foreign countries
Section 3262 simply provides that a person described in section 3261(a) who the
DOD has probable cause to believe has violated section 3261(a) may be arrested by any
104

See supra notes 18-23 an accompanying text.

105

Schmitt supra note 87, at 116

106

Id.

107

Id.
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person serving in a law enforcement position in the DOD to arrest. The section also
provides that a person arrested “shall be delivered as soon as practicable to the custody of
civilian law enforcement authorities of the United States for removal to the United States
for judicial proceedings in relation to conduct…”108
4. Section 3263 – Delivery to authorities of foreign countries; Section
3264 – Limitation on removal; Section 3265 – Initial proceedings; and
Section 3266 – Regulations
Section 3263 provides who will deliver an alleged criminal to foreign authorities
and the legal requirements for doing so.109 Section 2364 places limits on the removal of
an alleged criminal if a Federal magistrate judges orders such a limit or the Secretary of
Defense determines that some type of military necessity requires that the limits be
waived.110 If a suspect is to be handed over to the foreign jurisdiction the foreign
authorities must request delivery for the purposes of conducting a trial for an offense
under the laws of the country and a treaty or international agreement must exist allowing
the delivery.111

So, there are two prongs: there must be a request by the foreign

government and a treaty must exist between the U.S. and that country allowing delivery.
Section 3265 describes the necessary initial proceedings that must occur when an alleged
criminal has been arrested or charged with a violation of MEJA.112 These initial judicial
proceedings do not need to occur with the defendant physically present in a U.S. court. If

108

Id.

109

18 U.S.C. §3263

110

18 U.S.C. §2364

111

18 U.S.C. §3263(a)(1) and (2)

112

18 U.S.C. §3265
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the defendant has been arrested and charged with a violation of section 3261(a), the
initial appearance before a Federal magistrate judge may be carried out by telephone or
another voice communication device.113

Also, the Federal magistrate judge may

determine, upon finding the existence probable cause, that the conditions under which
defendant is released until trial.114
Finally, section 3266 allows the Secretary of Defense, after the consultation with
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to promulgate regulations governing the
apprehension, detention, delivery, and removal of persons who are being prosecuted
under MEJA.115 However, these subsequent regulations promulgated by DOD have not
been put into place in the six years since the Act’s passage.

Part III – MEJA only partially fixes the problem
As stated in the opening, PMCs are civilian staffed corporations that provide
military (and law enforcement) services, logistics, and support under contract to a
government. Prior to Congress passing the MEJA, U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction to
prosecute civilians accompanying United States’ Armed Forces overseas. This Article
addressed how the United States exercises jurisdiction and prosecutes the civilian
employees of PMCs for crimes they have committed in foreign countries in United States
courts.
In this final section, this Article will start with a brief overview of common
suggestions by scholars in the area because their suggestions are particularly relevant to
113

18 U.S.C. §3265(A) and (B)

114

18 U.S.C. §3265(B)(3)

115

18 U.S.C. §3266
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my analysis. Next, will respond to these findings. Finally, I will discuss the positive
aspects that MEJA and the negative consequences that have resulted or that might happen
in the future.
A. Other scholar’s suggestions for MEJA
Fredrick Stein points out several shortcomings that still existed after the 2004
amendment to MEJA. First, MEJA only applies to civilians who are working in support
of a DOD mission overseas.116 This means that if they are not working under a contract
that supports a DOD mission they do not qualify for prosecution under MEJA.
Contractors for the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, would not be within the
scope of MEJA because they do not fall under the definition provided in section 3267.117
Second, crimes punishable by less than a year are not covered by the act.118 Third, the
Act provides that the DOD should promulgate regulations that implement the substantive
provisions of the Act.119 Unfortunately, DOD has yet to promulgate these regulations.120
B. My response
Some of Stein’s findings need to be addressed before MEJA can really meet its
legislative goals. MEJA’s scope is still too narrow because other federal agencies that do
not fall within the definitions of section 3267, those not supporting a DOD mission
overseas but who still engage in overseas activity, are not covered in the “definitions”

116

See, Stein supra note 75, at 599.

117

Id. at 601.

118

Id. at 602.

119

Id. at 603.

120

Id.

- 27 -

Dustin Tipling
section.121 This Article takes the position that MEJA cannot be a success if Congress
does not remedy this basic flaw.
This article takes issue with Stein’s suggestion that MEJA should include
jurisdiction for crimes punishable with less than a year in jail. Crimes punishable for less
than a year of imprisonment should not be punishable under the statute. A balance
between justice and practicality should play into the decision of crimes punishable under
the statute. Many PMCs operate in foreign countries, such as Iraq, which puts them in a
precarious situation. Iraq lacks basic infrastructure making it simply to onerous to:
detect, investigate, and respond to crimes that are punishable with less than a year in jail.
This is not to say that the government has no remedy; they can terminate the contract and
remove the individual from the country for such minor infractions of the law. They could
take further steps such as contract termination with the PMC and prevent the employee
from working in any capacity for the federal government, but punishing crimes
punishable with less than a year in jail is not practical.
Finally, the DOD needs to develop and implement the supplemental regulations
provided for under MEJA.

As I discussed earlier, these regulations relate to the

apprehension, detention, delivery, and removal of persons who are being prosecuted
under MEJA.122 These regulations are necessary to properly prosecute an individual
under MEJA and provide for adequate due process for individuals charged with a crime.

121

See part III(D) below for a full discussion of this criticism of MEJA.

122

See supra note 93, and accompanying text.

- 28 -

Dustin Tipling
C. Positive Aspects of MEJA
The basic point and legislative goal of MEJA is to provide an avenue for the U.S.
to ensure that criminals are brought to justice.123 The Act provides U.S. prosecutors with
a means to hold civilians accountable for their actions overseas when they are deployed
with the military or working with the DOD. The current wording of MEJA will cover
any civilian contractor who meets the definition of section 3267. Not only are most
PMCs covered by the 2004 amendment, but so are virtually all other government
contractors operating overseas in support of a DOD mission.
MEJA can prevent the disastrous embarrassment that resulted from the United
States’ past inability to prosecute criminals. No longer will rapists, human traffickers,
drug dealers, and murders escape justice simply because of the government’s lack of
jurisdiction to prosecute them. The Abu Ghraib scandal is a scar on President George W.
Bush’s presidency and has brought shame to America’s armed forces. Abu Ghraib will
be a lasting image in many viewers’ minds about the Iraq war. Those that will violate
laws, like Steven Stefanowicz’s, will now lose their free pass and face justice before a
U.S. Court because of MEJA.
Further, MEJA allows the United States to prosecute an alleged criminal even
after the jurisdiction where the crime occurred has finished prosecuting them.124 Under
section 3261(b), the Attorney General can still bring the defendant before a U.S. Federal
court on criminal charges under MEJA. This is a useful provision because a foreign
jurisdiction could do many things other than prosecute an alleged criminal under what the
U.S. government (and the American people) would consider satisfactory and just. In that
123

See supra notes 75-77, and accompanying text.

124

See supra notes 99-100.
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same respect, it protects the defendant by preventing double prosecution for the same
offense. The U.S. cannot prosecute a defendant who is currently or has been prosecuted
by a foreign jurisdiction without the approval of the Attorney General.125
Section 3265 of MEA allows many of the preliminary judicial proceedings to
occur without brining the civilian back to the United States to appear before the court in
person. This is good for a defendant and the PMC he is employed by because it does not
remove him from his job, which may be critical in certain situations. Further, after the
initial hearing before the Federal magistrate and upon the finding of probable cause that a
crime has occurred, the judge may set the terms of the defendant’s release before trial.
These two provisions taken together protect and preserve the ability of the contractor to
continue their contractual obligations. In Iraq, for example, it can be extremely difficult
to replace an employee in a timely fashion. This can become critical in the security
industry because if the contract is to protect dignitaries and the PMC is short on staff
because an employee needs to appear before a court in the United States, they jeopardize
the safety of the dignitary.
D. Negative Aspects of MEJA
Congress must keep a balance between prosecuting criminals and recognizing the
situation that the employee’s of PMCs are put into while performing their duties under
the contract. PMCs operate in austere locations around the world with utter chaos around
them. As I discussed in Part I, many employees of PMCs are former military servicemen,
some with substantial combat experience. They are accustomed to dangerous work and
they are familiar with operating under a military protocol. If the law is enforced too

125

Id.
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strictly or without regard to the environment in which the PMC operate injustice could
potentially result.
For example, PMC civilian employees that private security detail for government
officials and other dignitaries can be put in situations where they need to make quick,
tough choices.126 Hypothetically speaking, if a member of the private security detail shot
an innocent civilian during an armed engagement he could potentially be faced with a
criminal prosecution for his error.127 In contrast, if a member of the armed forces shot an
innocent civilian during an armed engagement he would not be subject to civilian
criminal penalties for his actions. Rather, only his peers and those that truly understand
or have the ability to understand his situation would judge him at his/her military hearing.
Human rights must be preserved and guarded, but politically motivated prosecution of a
civilian in U.S. civilian courts for acts he/she may have committed could result and
Congress should design the law to prevent this from happening.
Further, as Stein states, there still is a gap in jurisdiction because MEJA does not
cover all federal agencies and therefore, not all civilian contractors are covered under its
provisions. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is potentially beyond the
scope of MEJA.128 Also, the 2004 amendment to section 3267 still requires that the
employment relate “…to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense
overseas…”129 This still leaves a porous jurisdictional gap because the DOD is not the
only federal agency that hires contractors to perform work overseas.
126

See supra, notes 32-34.

127

I make this hypothetical only to provide an example and I base its facts in no real world example.

128

See, Fidler supra note 25.

129

18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(a)
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For example, in May 2005, DynCorp International LLC signed a contract with
State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(INL) for annual contract value of $174 million (or more) to “…assist foreign
governments in the eradication and interdiction of illicit crops such as coca and opium
poppy.”130 The contract is between the Department of State and the PMC with no direct
DOD involvement. Many activist groups have been critical of DynCorp contractors in
South America, although none cite any actual crimes.131 But the potential exists and the
U.S. would have no criminal jurisdiction over one of DynCorp’s employees operating in
South America under a contract with the State Department because they do not fall within
the definition in section 3267.

Absent prosecution by the local South American

government, any violations of law could potentially go unpunished.
Finally, if a foreign jurisdiction requests that the United States deliver an alleged
criminal they must meet the two prongs of section 3262(a).132 If a treaty is not in place
allowing such a delivery of the civilian to a foreign authority then he/she cannot be
delivered to the foreign jurisdiction. This could potentially be an issue because many
civilians working overseas for PMCs work on U.S. military installations. They are
essentially isolated from the general population of the foreign country—and their
government. Any discussion of the types of treaties or international agreements required
to satisfy the prong is outside the scope of this Article, but it could potentially create a

130

DynCorp International LLC Press Release: DynCorp International Again Wins State Department
Contract for Narcotics Eradication and Interdiction, http://www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=67(last
visited on March 31, 2006).
131

See generally, Jason Vest, State Outsources Secret War, The Nation, May 23, 2001,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010604/vest20010523.

132

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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diplomatic or political problem if the foreign jurisdiction is seeking the employee of a
PMC for local prosecution.

Conclusion
In conclusion, MEJA is a giant step forward in brining criminals to justice but the
shoe still is not big enough to include all the potential civilians that it should. Congress
needs to expand the definitions of 3267 to include all federal agencies to ensure criminal
jurisdiction for any PMCs working under a contract for the United States government.
Also, the United States needs to ensure that the employees of PMCs have some
guarantees that they will not be held to an unreasonable standard when they are put in
dangerous situations doing extremely dangerous work. Justice is not done if someone
does not perform to the best of their ability because they fear criminal. The Act can and
will be an effective tool to help insure that criminals are held accountable and victims of
crimes can seek justice, Congress just needs to work out the details.
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